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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Australia is currently undergoing a watershed period 
in the development of national defence policy. The post-war 
decades of tranquil economic development, cushioned by the 
comfortable expectation that our great and powerful ally, 
the United States would protect Australia in the face of 
any national security threat, have steadily evaporated 
under the impact of major strategic developments in the 
international arena during the sixties and seventies. 
Awareness of the need to reassess Australia's strategic 
situation and review defence policy has generally developed 
slowly and somewhat reluctantly and apart from a few 
specialists in the field, the public debate generated in 
recent years by the enquiries of the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence has represented 
the first major attempt since the war, at the political level, 
to focus national attention on Australia's future defence 
requirements. The Committee's enquiries have addressed a 
wide range of issues and provided a valuable public forum for 
discussion of defence matters. 
It is in the context of a rapidly changing strategic 
environment and a resurgent public interest in the defence 
debate that the question of US-Australian military and 
scientific facilities in Australia is receiving scrutiny, 
In this respect the work of the Parliamentary Committee from 
2 
1980 to 1983 in conducting major inquiries into defence and 
security matters and promoting informed and rational debate 
on the subject of the joint defence facilities has been 
invaluable. 
From Australia's perspective, the international 
strategic environment has changed dramatically and without 
warning in the last two decades. There has been tension 
and conflict in Southeast Asia, South Asia 1 Africa, Latin 
America, Central America and within the communist world. 
Major realignments have occurred between China and the 
United States and China and Japan~ Conflict in the Gulf 
States has had ramifications on oil supplies and the energy 
policies of most nations. The domestic politics within many 
countries, including Australia, have witnessed dramatic 
upheavals and changes. However, throughout this period, 
Australian leaders and their advisors have largely been 
content to rely on the assessment that there are no direct 
threats on the horizon and consequently, that there is little 
urgency about exerting much effort towards improving defence 
capabilities. 
In his evidence to the Joint Committee enquiring into 
the implementation of the Australian Government's announced 
Defence programs, T.B. Millar strongly disputed this view . 
... it is beyond reason to assume that 
the next two decades will be ones of 
international calm, with all changes 
foreseeable, foreseen, evolutionary in 
nature, and anticipated by our wise 
precautions. The reverse is much more 
11. 
likely and the crisis in Afghanistan 
must be seen as one of a whole range 
of events that will affect 
international peace and security 
with a speed and severity not likely 
to be matched by our perceptions or 
our preparations.l 
Whilst the recent developments in the Middle East, 
3 
Iran, Iraq, the south Atlantic and Grenada are geographically 
distant, they nevertheless have great significance for 
Australia and the Western alliance system and serve to 
illustrate the unnredictable nature of international 
~ 
relations and the dangers of relying on threat-free strategic 
assessments. 
It is to be expected that international tensions and 
disputes associated with ongoing friction about resources, 
boundaries, racial differences, historical events and many 
other factors will always be a feature of international life. 
This underlies the need for continual application of 
diplomatic skill supported by the capacity to defend national 
interests in a more tangible way if required. 
To date, in the absence of any direct threat to 
continental Australia for some forty years, there has been 
considerable evidence of complacency on the part of political 
and military leaders. The Defence White Paper of 1976 
confirms this impression. It argues that the conjunction of 
conditions giving rise to military action is infrequent among 
the nations of the world and takes time to develop 2 and that 
1 T.B. Millar, evidence to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, 2 April 1980. 
2 Defence White Paper, A.G.P.S., November 1976, p.2. 
... major threats (requiring both 
military capability and political 
motivation) are unlikely to develop 
without preceding and perceptible 
indicators. The final emergence of 
a major military threat to Australia 
would be a late stage in a series of 
developments.3 
Yet many of the major disturbances and conflicts of 
4 
the past decade have been largely unforeseen and unpredictable. 
As in the cases of Iran, Afghanistan and the Falklandst they 
appeared to develop overnight, and furthermore they did not 
occur in the three key areas of strategic significance, the 
nuclear relationship and the theatres of central Europe and 
Northeast Asia identified in the White Paper. Certainly 
the nations of the Western world had taken few specific 
precautions to meet such contingencies. Beginning with the 
OPEC oil crisis of the early seventies and continuing through 
to the most recent conflicts in the Falklands and Grenada, 
the implications are now very clear. No nation can afford 
the luxury of a 'no foreseeable threats' attitude to its 
defence planning, however attractive that may be for domestic 
political, budgetary or diplomatic purposes. 
Whilst the 1976 White Paper recognised the changing 
strategic circumstances it concluded that, on the whole, 
Australia 1 s position was favourable and it made no firm 
recommendations in favour of a major rethinking of defence 
issues. There was no clarification of whether overall 
orientation of policy should be towards inhibiting the 
emergence of threats or reacting to them, or some combination 
3 ibid., p.10. 
1 .. 
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of both. Although it is well recognised that continental 
defence is the basis of national security planning, the 
extent of geographic responsibility remains unclear and 
questions remain concerning the inclusion of Papua New 
Guinea, Antarctica, the two hundred mile fishing limit, 
resources zones, sea bed boundaries or nearby island 
territories. The concept of self reliance has yet to be 
formulated in planning policy and the circumstances in which 
the post Guam Doctrine and now more qualified ANZUS treaty 
might become operative need clarification. In addition, 
questions remain regarding Australian policy on uranium and 
nuclear weapons and although these matters have been discussed 
to some extent in recent statements by the Prime Minister, 
Mr R.J. Hawke, 4 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Mr W. Hayden, 5 and in the leaked Strategic Basis papers, 6 
all of these matters need clarification. It is to be hoped 
that the next Defence White Paper will address these issues. 
In relation to the American alliance, the 1976 Paper 
recognises that 'even though our security may be ultimately 
dependent upon US support, we owe it to ourselves to .be able 
to mount a national defence effort that would maximise the 
risks and costs of any aggression' , 7 but it fails to assess 
4 R.J. Hawke, C.P.D. (Hof R), 6 June 1984. 
5 W. Hayden, Uranium, The Joint Facilities, Disarmament and 
Peace, A.G.P.S., 1984. 
6 
'The Strategic Basis Papers', The National Times, 30 March 
1984. 
7 f h' . De ence W 1te Paper, op.cit. 
{ 
6 
the types of threats which would elicit United States 
support or the significance of the US defence related 
facilities on Australian soil. Australia's historical and 
political orientation towards great and powerful allies, 
firstly Britain and then the United States, has engendered 
habits of dependency which are hard to break. Whilst there 
is no doubt that these alliances have served Australia well 
in the past and could do so in the future, there is also 
no doubt that in the post Vietnam War years, United States 
interests in the Southeast Asian and Pacific area have been 
fundamentally reassessed and that it is highly unlikely 
that forces and resources will be committed to the same 
extent again. However, whilst it is recognised that the 
threshold of US military involvement may have risen, 
nevertheless the American commitment to the region in 
principle remains firm and wou1d be given more tangible 
forms of support if perceived to be in the US national 
interest~ 
Alliance with the United States has characterised 
Australia's post World War II thinking, with the dispatch of 
Australian forces in some cases and support for the US by 
Australia's spokesmen in international forums as insurance 
premiums for the continuance of the alliance. Both sides 
have benefited from the relationship, the United States in 
having a dependable ally on another side of the globe, and 
Australia in enjoying the protection of a great and powerful 
friend~ The establishment of the joint defence and scientific 
11
1 
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facilities in Australia occurred largely during the fifties 
and sixties when the alliance enjoyed its most popular 
support in Australia. The significance of these facilities 
for Australian defence policy, the costs of hosting the 
facilities and indeed, the facilities themselves, received 
little public attention until recent years, when renewed 
public interest in defence matters was generated by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
by government decisions regarding major defence purchases 
and by publication of a number of academic books and articles 
critical of aspects of existing policy. 
These developments are an encouraging sign that defence 
matters are receiving the public prominence and attention 
they deserve and that the habit of dependence on a great 
and powerful ally is lessening in favour of a more critical 
evaluation of security needs in the light of a realistic 
assessment of national interests. In relation to the extent 
of overlap in US and Australian national interests, the 
circumstances in which it is unreasonable of us to expect 
a superpower to treat Australia as a partner and the need 
for independent analysis, R.H. Mathams has commented 
To me that is one excellent reason 
for having a very competent, objective, 
professional intelligence analysis 
organisation which looks at the United 
States in exactly the same way as it 
looks at the Soviet Union, China, France 
or whatever, not as a putative enemy but 
as an object for study. Such an 
organisation should try to determine the 
future policies and future actions of the 
United States. That is a legitimate role 
f·· 
for a national intelligence assessment 
organisation. It does not imply that 
we have any antipathy towards the 
United States.8 
In this renewed defence debate, serious consideration is 
8 
now being given to the development of an indigenous defence 
capability and the myth that Australia would not be capable 
in any circumstances of defending herself with her own 
resources has been strongly disputed by analysts including 
R. O'Neill and R. Babbage. 9 Nevertheless, given Australia's 
changed strategic environment and the necessity for a more 
self-reliant continental defence policy based on regional 
assessments, the pervasive attitudes associated with 
dependence on powerful allies do not auger well for the 
future. In this respect the work of the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee in its enquiries into 'Threats to Australia's 
Security', 'The ANZUS Alliance' and other defence matters, 
has been most important in promoting better public 
understanding of the issues involved. 
Throughout these Committee enquiries the subject of 
the joint defence facilities has received considerable 
attention, not only from academics but also from defence 
specialists whose views are not usually widely available 
to the general public. The Committee Reports and Transcripts 
8 R.H. Mathams, evidence to Parliamentary Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, 9 February 1981. 
9 See for example R. O'Neill (ed), The Defence of Australia: 
Fundamental New Aspects and R. Babbage, Rethinking Australia's 
Defence. 
I:· 
9 
constitute a valuable source of information on the 
significance of the joint facilities for Australian defence 
policy in addition to the recent literature on the subject 
since the publication of D. Ball's A Suitable Piece of Real 
Estate in 1980. The Joint Committee, in pr?viding a 
bipartisan forum for the discussion of defence issues, can 
be expected to continue to provide a unique contribution to 
the defence debate in the coming years as it carries out its 
task of establishing a framework or set of criteria with 
which to judge the adequacy of Australia's defence. 
The major strategic problem for Australia in the 
eighties will be to define its future role and national 
interests in an international system where dynamic changes 
can occur within a very short time. There are no easy 
solutions, but it is vital to Australia's security to 
establish a viable defence capacity within the regional 
context and to ensure that adequate resources are applied to 
the program of ongoing policy analysis and review which 
evaluates policy in the light of continuous assessment of 
national interests. In relation to the joint facilities, it 
is essential that the ongoing appraisal of their function and 
role be carried out in terms of their contribution to 
Australia's national interests. In this way Australia will 
ensure that it does not become dependent on American goodwill 
and perception of self interest for its security. The 
American alliance is important to Australia especially in the 
global context, but it is no substitute for a responsible 
Australian national security policy. 
10 
CHAPTER II 
THE JOINT DEFENCE FACILITIES IN AUSTRALIA 
The establishment of joint defence facilities in 
Australia originated during World War II in collaboration 
with both the British and the Americans. Since that time 
the growth in the number and the scope of the joint 
facilities has closely parallelled Australia's increasing 
commitment to the American alliance and by the 1980s an 
extensive defence system of technically sophisticated 
communications and intelligence-gathering facilities along 
with a number of scientific installations exists on 
Australian soil~ These facilities have become the subject 
of considerable debate in recent years in regard to their 
implication for Australian national security, sovereignty 
and foreign policy. 
As the Hansard record of Parliament shows, numerous 
questions have been asked over the years since 1963 about 
the functions and significance of the facilities for Australian 
defence policy and have been answered with varying degrees 
of candour. 1 The most important aspect of Ball's work is 
the contribution made towards greater public understanding 
of the nature and role of the installations in terms of our 
national interests and the changing character and significance 
of the facilities as technological developments take place. 
1 The most comprehensive answer provided by any Minister for 
Defence was Mr Killen's reply to a question on notice from 
Mr Scholes C.P.D. (Hof R), 10 October 1978. 
The product of increasing the amount 
of publicly available information 
about the US installations should be 
a much more informed debate on this 
controversial but critical subject. 
Most of the installations were 
established during a period when 
Australia faced an entirely different 
alliance relationship; a national 
stocktaking is long overdue~2 
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In the past three years during the course of several inquiries 
by the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and 
Defence the resurgence of public interest in defence matters 
has resulted in more informed discussion and debate. Expert 
witnesses to the Committee have provided an analysis of the 
role and significance of the joint facilities which has 
greatly enhanced the general level of understanding of the 
issues involved. 
The facilities can be broadly classified under three 
headings - communications, intelligence-gathering and 
scientific . A definitive account of all the facilities is 
difficult to compile because of the classified nature of 
the work being carried out. 
The first group of facilities, those with communications 
and navigation functions, includes the North West Cape 
station, the Omega navigation station in East Gippsland, 
Victoria and the TRANET station 112 at Smithfield in South 
Australia. 
The most important of the communications facilities, 
and arguably the most significant in strategic terms is the 
North West Cane installation established in 1963 near Exmouth 
~ 
2 D. Ball,~ Suitable Piece of Real Estate, p.157. 
12 
in western Australia. The establishment of this facility 
was given warm approval by the Australian government which 
agreed to permit the American government to establish, 
maintain and operate for a minimum of twenty-five years, a 
naval communication station at North West Cape at a 
peppercorn rental. In his second reading speech introducing 
the enabling legislation, Sir Garfield Barwick outlined the 
station's purpose as being 'to transmit and receive wireless 
messages' and that use of the facilities of the station by 
Australian forces would significantly increase their 
effectiveness both in training and in wartime operations 
in terms of mutual ANZUS obligations~ 3 The terms of the 
agreement included Australian right of access to the station 
at all times 1 and 'without qualification, restriction of the 
use of the station to defence communication except with 
Australian consent'. 4 However it was further stated that 
a basic principle of the agreement was that the station 
shall be in the sole control of the United States and that 
'it is not intended to give Australia control or access to 
the content of messages transmitted over the station' . 5 
These contradictory elements were partially resolved at 
the renegotiation of the agreement on 1974 when it was agreed 
that the North West Cape would become a 'joint facility'. 
There had been concern expressed in some academic and political 
3 Sir Garfield Barwick, C.P.D. (Hof R), 9 May 1963. 
4 
'b'd l l . 
S 'b'd l l • 
1 .
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circles that Australian interests were not being fully 
acknowledged. D. Ball states that in 1972 the station was 
used to support the mining of North Vietnamese Harbours and 
in October 1973 was used to communicate a low-level general 
nuclear alert without reference to the Australian government. 6 
In 1978 a new satellite ground station was installed without 
consultation with the Australian government causing 
considerable embarrassment t o the then Defence Minister, 
Mr Killen, in Parliament. Subsequent discussions between 
American and Australian officials improved the process of 
consultation between the two governments. 
In terms of strategic importance to the United States' 
global activities, North West Cape is an essential link in 
the chain of communications with the US Fleet ballistic 
missile submarines and, with its recently upgraded satellite 
monitoring capability, it will be able to provide more 
extensive communications facilities to US naval forces. 
The possibility that the orders could be transmitted without 
Australian knowledge through North West Cape to American 
fleet ballistic missile submarines carrying nuclear weapons 
and that these orders could be contrary to Australian 
interests has been addressed by the present Minister of 
Foreign Affairs . 
... agreement has been reached between 
the US and Australian Governments on 
new arrangements to ensure that the 
Australian Government is able to make 
6 D. Ball, op.cit . , p . 145. 
11~· 
timely judgements about the 
significance for our national 
interests of developments 
involving North West Cape. 
Those arrangements are now in 
force. 7 
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The second major category and perhaps most controversial 
of the joint facilities in Australia is that associated with 
the gathering of intelligence. These facilities include 
Pine Gap, Nurrungar, and the activities of the US National 
Security Agency at North West Cape and other areas in 
conjunction with the Defence Signals Directorate, as well as 
some aspects of the work of the space tracking stations' 
seismological, meteorological and other scientific facilities. 
However it is the defence satellite ground facilities in 
central Austalia with sophisticated electronic surveillance 
capacity that have generated most public debate. 
Both the United States-Australian Joint Defence Space 
Research Facility (UDSRF) at Pine Gap and the Joint Defence SpacE 
Communication Station (JDSCS) at Nurrungar within the Woomera 
restricted area undertake a wide range of military and 
intelligence operations in space. Both installations were 
initiated in the late sixties and became operational in 1970. 
Successive governments have maintained that they are satisfied 
that the activities are not harmful to Australia's interests 
and that the facilities contribute to global stability. 
This view was reiterated in an official submission of the 
Department of Defence to the Parliamentary Joint Committee's 
enquiry into 'Australia-United States Relations' in June 1982. 
7 w. Hayden, op.cit., p.17. 
I.·· 
In the case of JDSRF at Pine Gap 
and JDSCS at Nurrungar the nature 
and purpose of the facilities are 
secret. Neither facility is part 
of a weapons system and neither 
can be used to attack another 
country and both are conducted 
with Australia's full knowledge and 
participation ., 8 
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In answer to a further question about the reality of 
'Australia's full knowledge and participation', the Defence 
Department spokesman R.W. Cottrill stated that 
Those at the site, Australian and 
American, whose responsibilities so 
require, have equal rights of access 
to all parts of the facility, to its 
activities and to all results of the 
research, excepting only national 
communications rooms where cipher 
communications are kept private 
The principle of full knowledge and 
concurrence underlies our 
participation in these joint 
facilities ... There is no way in 
which systematic deception or 
activities detrimental to Australian 
interests, could go undetected. 9 
This view has been confirmed more recently by the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs. 
Contrary to speculation which appe ars 
from time to time in the media, the 
information produced by Nurrungar and 
Pine Gap is fully available to Australia. 
Properly qualified Australian personnel 
participate in all areas of activity at 
these facilities. Australia is therefore 
able to ensure that nothing takes place 
in those facilities which is contrary to 
Australian Government policy, including 
the Australian Government's opposition to 
so-called nuclear war fighting and any 
concept of first strike capability.10 
8 Department of Defence Submission to Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 1 June 1982. 
9 R.W. Cottrill, evidence in ibid. 
lO W. Hayden, op.cit., p.18. 
I 
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The third category of joint facilities in Australia 
includes a variety of seismic geological, meteorological, 
space tracking and other scientific projects in a number of 
locations throughout Australia. The major scientific 
facilities are those operated by the US National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA) in Australia. Whilst 
Australia has always cooperated with the US in its satellite 
tracking operations by providing facilities and personnel 
at a variety of locations, there are now only three stations 
still operative. These operations, all located in the ACT, 
are the Honeysuckle Creek Tracking Station, the Tidbinbilla 
Deep Space Communication Complex and the Orroral Valley 
Spaceflight Tracking and Data Network Station. Together, 
they represent the most significant NASA facility outside 
the US and have assisted in tracking satellites, the Apollo 
manned lunar landing project, the Skylab project and other 
space probes to the planets and beyond. In this capacity, 
they provide an essential link in the US global communication 
network with spacecraft. 
The fundamental tenet underlying Australian support 
for the joint facilities is the assessment that Australia's 
security is directly supported by the maintenance of the 
central strategic balance. The 'Strategic Basis of Australian 
Defence Policy' documents published recently address this 
question and although published without official approval 
have not had their authenticity officially denied. These 
documents outline this commitment: 
Australia as a non-nuclear power cannot 
contribute directly to US nuclear 
deterrent capability. However we 
contribute indirectly to the US strategic 
effort through the maintenance in 
Australia of defence related facilities -
particularly communications for the USN's 
SSBM deterrent force and the important 
facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar~ We 
also contribute to Western efforts by our 
providing staging facilities for USAF 
aircraft, by occasional provision of 
training areas and through the use of 
Australian port facilities by USN wars~ips, 
including nuclear powered vesselsell 
17 
The recent Prime Ministerial statement on Arms Control and 
Disarmament reiterates this point. 
The government takes the view that the 
joint facilities directly contribute to 
the security that we enjoy every day and 
that this tangible benefit outweighs the 
possibility that risks might arise at some 
future time from our hosting the facilities.12 
The PM's statement to Parliament after consultation with the 
United States Government acknowledged the need to assist 
public understanding and argued strongly that the facilities 
enhanced deterrence and arms control. Whilst these arguments 
are not new and have been well recognised by academics and 
other analysts in this area, the Prime Ministerial statement 
served to raise the general level of acceptance of defence 
policy development. 
Similarly, a subsequent pamphlet by the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, Mr Hayden, was also directed towards 
explaining policy to the public as well as party factions. 
11 
'The Strategic Basis Papers', op.cit., p.24. 
12 k 't R.J. Hawe, op.ci . 
In discussing the most effective means of promoting arms 
control and deterrence of nuclear war, he stated: 
The joint facilities contribute to that 
deterrence by providing timely knowledge 
of developments that have military 
significance. The more each side knows 
about what the other is doing, the 
greater is the confidence that they can 
each have in the system of mutual 
deterrence and in the unlikelihood of a 
nuclear Pearl Harbour. If we were to 
abolish the joint facilities from 
Australian territory, we would be 
delivering a major blow to deterrence 
and we would therefore be delivering a 
major blow to the cause of arms control. 1 3 
18 
These Ministerial statements whether prompted by the leak 
of the Strategic Basis papers, internal party dynamics or 
other motives, are a welcome sign that the defence policy 
debate is receiving much more attention in the Parliament 
and the national press. Following the valuable work of the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence 
the renewed defence debate should assist the difficult 
process of policy development in a less certain strategic 
environment. 
13 w. Hayden, op.cit., p.15. 
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The main strategic problems for Australia can be 
discussed at two levels. Firstly, there is the set of 
problems associated with the historical-political orientation 
toward the world and the changes in the global strategic 
balance and secondly, there are regional considerations 
related to assessments of potential threats and development 
of appropriate responses. Of course~ the two are 
interconnected and the difficult problem facing defence 
planners is to define the security threats most likely to 
necessitate Australian action. 
In recent years, the global strategic environment has 
altered considerably as a result of the changing relationship 
between the great powers, the emergence of new centres of 
power and influence such as Japan, China and the Middle East, 
US strategic reassessments including the Guam Doctrine, rapid 
technological changes in military capabilities as well as 
a number of volatile and largely unexpected developments in 
the international arena including events in Iran, Afghanistan 
and Central America. The impact of these global developments 
for the Australian strategic environment has yet to be fully 
assessed although a number of academic analysts have drawn 
attention to these issues and their importance for Australian 
defence planning in the eighties. It is apparent that 
Australia's national security needs in the post-Guam Doctrine 
II 
I• 
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period are now very different from those of preceding years 
and that, in the absence of any clearly defined threat, the 
major problem remains the difficulty of determining policy 
and allocating resources in a political environment where 
defence matters including evaluation of national interests 
and future security needs are nob perceived to be an 
immediate priority. 
Underlying the strategic problems facing Australia are 
historical and political factors that have shaped Australian 
attitudes and policies. As a former colony,and until the 
Second World War, Australia depended almost entirely for her 
security on Britain and identified completely with the 
security issues facing the motherland. If Britain went to 
war, so too did Australia. By the time of the Pacific War 
however, it became abundantly clear that Australian and 
British national interests no longer coincided and Australia ' s 
leaders turned to the United State s for security and prote ction. 
Alliance with the United States has characterised Australian 
post-war thinking and defence planning, at times necessitating 
the dispatch of Australian forces in support of American 
interests as insurance premiums for the continuation of 
American protection. However, since the Vietnam War and US 
reevaluation of its national interests in Southeast Asia, 
there is a heightened need for reassessment of the strategic 
environment and appropriate arrangements to ensure that 
Australia is capable of defending herself within her own 
. 
region. 
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The habit of dependence on a great and powerful ally 
dies hard. The myth that Australia would not be capable 
of defending herself from her own resources is evidence of 
this and has been strongly disputed by a number of academic 
analysts. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign 
Affairs and Defence in its report on 'Threats to Australia's 
Security' recognises the need to dispel the myth and comments 
If this Report has any particular target 
~tis the reasonably well informed 
citizen who has made no special study 
of defence, and who has the impression 
that because of its vast coastline and 
small population Australia is 
fundamentally indefensible. 
And in discussing the regional environment the report comments 
that 
It is the Committee's hope that a frank 
discussion of such matters will dispel 
unnecessary fears, lead to an informed 
and balanced appreciation of Australia's 
regional relationships and improve the 
climate of understanding between 
Australia and its neighbours.l 
The Committee is to be commended for attempting to overcome 
these pervasive attitudes of dependence which are not 
appropriate given Australia's changed strategic ~nvironment 
and the necessity for a more self reliant contin~ntal defence 
policy, following the demise of the forward defence era. 
A further aspect of this discussion is the neglect of 
regional relations over the years as a result of orienting 
strategic analysis towards European and North American 
1 Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, 
Threats to Australia's Security, A.G.P.S., 1981, p.ix. 
[·· 
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concerns. Certainly some regional commitments, the Colombo 
Plan Five Power Defence arrangements and others have been I . 
implemented and some progress towards a more 'international' 
approach with greater recognition of Australia's regional 
role was begun during the Whitlam period and has continued 
to the present day, but on the whole, Australian preconceptions, 
philosophies and strategic planning are still being shaped 
to a large extent by the imperatives of the industrialised 
Western powers. This has important implications for 
Australia's defence planning in terms of policies, equipment 
purchases and alliances. The Strategic Basis pa?ers provide 
both a global and regional view. The papers outline the 
significance of the central balance of power for Australia. 
The ability and resolve of the US to 
maintain effective strategic competition 
with the USSR is of fundamental 
importance for Australia's security. 
At the same time continuing strategic 
competition between the superpowers 
heightens global tensions and the risk 
fo confrontation and conflict a2 
Strong argnments are presented for arms control and the US 
deterrent posture despite risks to Australia. There is 
recognition that Australia's limited resources mean that 
'our contribution would always be in the company of allies 
and, given the limited size of our forces, would not be a 
major factor in determining the course of the conflict' . 3 
In a conventional conflict between the superpowers Australia's 
major contribution would be in securing its immediate 
environment. 
2 
'Strategic Basis Papers', op.cit~, p.23~ 
3 ibid. , p. 2 4 .. 
II' 
Within the framework of the US system 
of alliances around the world, we could 
be expected to maintain the necessary 
deployments and patrols to secure our 
own neighbourhood. We could also be 
expected to secure Australia's key air 
and naval support facilities and their 
approaches against the contingency of 
US or other allied use.4 
23 
ThusI while the central balance of power is vital to 
Australia's security, the regional environment is the primary 
area of planning concern~ 
In discussing regional concerns, the Strategic Basis 
papers give considerable emphasis to the Asia Pacific area 
and major power involvement. US interests in the region 
include support of ASEAN, isolation of Vietnam, rapport with 
China and commitment to ANZUS. The Soviet alliance with 
Vietnam and its access to the port of Cam Ranh Bay is a 
source of concern. The Strategic Basis papers state that 
Australia's defence activity in Southeast Asia 'is an important 
element in US evaluation of Australia's strategic importance' 
and that 
The US's supportive but 'over-the-
horizon' role benefits Australian 
defence interests in minimal external 
involvement in the region, in constraint 
on Soviet and Vietnamese strategic 
pressure on the ASEAN governments and 
on those governments' confidence in 
dealing with the communist powers.5 
However the papers recognise the constraints on US support 
for Australia in the event of conflict between Australia and 
a regional power such as Indonesia. 
4 
'b'd l l . 
S ibid. , p. 2 8 . 
,., 
US alliance obligations to Australia are 
likely to lead it to influence Aust~alia 
towards handling a regional dispute in 
such a way that would avoid difficulty 
for the US and certainly US confrontation 
with the regional powers.6 
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The Papers argue that the presence of Australian fighter 
squadrons at Butterworth under Five Power auspices is the 
most tangible expression of Australian interest in the 
security of the region and is also regarded by the US as 
supportive of Western interests in the region~ 7 However 
in the event of Australian conflict with Indonesia, there 
would be real doubt about Malaysia's willingness to compromise 
itself with its ASEAN neighbours by agreeing to Australia's 
use of Butterworth aircraft~ Thus in such a situation, it 
is clear that Australia could not rely on tangible forms 
of assistance from its neighbours or its major ally and 
would need to look to its own resources and diplomatic 
efforts to ameliorate the position. As the Papers state, 
6 
7 
8 
ibid. 
ibid. 
ibid. ' 
Australian policy for some years has 
recognised that the threshold for direct 
US combat involvement could be quite high 
and circumstances at the time could 
significantly limit US willingness or 
ability to help Australia in other ways. 
While working to maximise the prospect of 
US support in any national defence 
emergency, Australian governments have 
therefore required clear priority to be 
given to the development of the capacity 
to conduct and support military operations 
for the independent defence of Australia.8 
p.29. 
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In regard to Australian relations with Indonesia, the 
assessment recognises that there are continuing difficulties 
over Timar, Radio Australia's critical comment about domestic 
politics and potential PNG border problems with Irian Jay a 
dissidents, but reports the Office of National Assessments 
finding that Indonesian policy will remain directed towards 
maintaining a sound and stable relationship with Australia, 
PNG and the countries of the South Pacific. 9 It is 
estimated that any change in the direction of mounting a 
credible military threat to Australia would require massive 
external support and would take at least ten years to develop. 
Provided Indonesia continues to give 
priority in military development to 
internal security and defence of its 
national territory, it should be 
possible with no more than modest 
increases in defence capacity to ensure 
that Australia's superiority is 
preserved.lo 
The possibility of escalating tension between Indonesia 
and PNG is of enormous concern to Australia. Any military 
incursion by Indonesia resulting in PNG requests for 
Australian military assistance would make it very difficult 
for Australia to refuse to become involved. As the Strategic 
Basis papers state 
9 
'b. d l l • 
Our enduring strategic interest is 
to avoid significant Indonesian attack 
against or foreign occupation of PNG 
and PNG cooperation in Indonesian attack 
against Australia. It also requires the 
lO ibid., p.30 .. 
continuing development of our policies 
for support of PNG's defence effort and 
of Australia's status as that country's 
primary defence partner.11 
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The importance of relations with Indonesia as the lynch pin 
on which Australia's regional relations are based is 
underscored by Australia's commitment to PNG and continued 
good relations between PNG and Indonesia are vital to 
Australia's national interests. 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee in its enquiry into 
the Nature and Probability of Threats to Australia's 
Security analysed the strategic environment in terms of the 
types of threats and contingencies which could face Australia 
and the level of capability needed to pose the type of 
threat, who has the capacity, who may have the motive, the 
likely warning time and possible deterrents. In particular 
the Report draws attention to the intermediate level threats 
and low level contingencies which may require an Australian 
response independent of the actions of our allies and which 
therefore have implications for the structure and capability 
of our defence force. 
Overall the Committee is cautiously reassuring, 
concluding that large-scale attack on Australia can be 
regarded as remote and improbable in the foreseeable future 
and that even for an economically advanced regional power, 
it could be expected to take at least five years to develop 
h . t 12 sue a capaci y. 
11 'b'd l l . 
The Report considers the invasion 
12 Parliamentary Joint Corr~ittee, op.cit., p.95. 
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capability of regional powers including Japan, China, India, 
Vietnam and Indonesia, and while recognising that these 
countries have large armies, concludes that they 'currently 
do not have the capacity to mount a credible conventional 
attack on Australian territory as they do not have the air, 
' ' b'l't' I ' d 13 sea and logistic capa ii ies require . 
In relation to intermediate level threats or limited 
lodgement operations, the Report concludes that such threats 
should be considered years rather than months away and that 
... it is difficult to envisage 
intermediate level threats arising 
against Australia short of a situation 
where the existing world order was 
disrupted, and where the attentions 
of Australia's main allies were totally 
preoccupied with serious military threats 
or large-scale economic disruption.14 
In addition the Report recognises the need for a reasonably 
large and competent intelligence effort for a nation which 
spends relatively little of its gross national product on 
defence and which would require long lead times to develop 
d , . t ~ 15 a equate equipmen anct manpower. 
Other potential threats to Australia include low level 
contingencies such as sporadic attacks against power stations, 
petrol refineries or other facilities, illegal exploitation 
of offshore resources, smuggling operations, terrorist attacks 
against domestic or overseas facilities and disruptive 
activities by dissident or minority groups. 
13 'b'd i i . I p.30. 
14 ibid. , p.96. 
15 ibid• / p.95. 
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The Strategic Basis papers discuss forms of pressure 
and harrassment which a country such as Indonesia could 
deploy either on the Australian mainland or Australian island 
territories which would elicit a disproportionate response. 
Provided the aim was political 
pressure rather than military 
destruction or territorial gain, 
the attacker could hold considerable 
strategic advantage. Attacks could 
be widely dispersed or random: 
relatively modest military pressure 
could oblige Australia to respond 
with quite disproportionate effort. 
The attacker could, if he wished, 
sustain low level activity virtually 
indefinitely, whereas the cost to 
Australia, both in resources and in 
political terms, of sustaining a 
posture of rapid response could be 
formidable.16 
Strategic options, including retaliation against the attacking 
country, would be limited by the need to avoid escalating 
the dispute and the need to maintain national and internationa: 
goodwill. 
Because there might be little warning associated with 
such low level threats, it is essential that the peacetime 
organisation and structure of the Defence force and other 
civil defence agencies have the capacity to deal with these 
problems. Little evidence on these matters was provided 
to the Parliamentary Joint Committee in its hearings and a 
number of issues need to be addressed. These include the 
adequacy of intelligence gathering, coastal surveillance and 
16 
' The Strategic Basis Papers', op.cit., p.30. 
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·resources in remote locations, as well as the role of active 
diplomacy, trade, aid and defence cooperation with regional 
states. 
In relation to global threats in terms of conventional 
warfare, Australia is relatively secure. 
Because of Australia's remote location 
and lack of land frontiers with other 
nations, because of its own not 
inconsiderable capacity to deter potential 
aggressors and because its alliance with 
the US involves the threat of American 
retaliation, Australia is a difficult 
invasion target. Currently only the United 
States would have the physical capacity to 
launch a full scale invasion of Australia 
and it clearly lacks any motive to do so. 
The Soviet Union would require South East 
Asian staging bases and additional 
equipment to mount a successful invasion, 
and it is difficult to envisage any 
conditions outside a general war that would 
make such a move worthwhile.17 
It is in the context of global nuclear warfare that 
the potentially most damaging, albeit improbable, threat 
lies to Australia's security. This threat exists largely 
because of the presence in Australia of the US defence 
related facilities such as North West Cape, Pine Gap and 
Nurrungar. Opinions vary on the extent to which these 
facilities would be targeted by the Soviet Union. 
R.H. Mathams has argued that, whilst these facilities would 
certainly feature in a Soviet target list, he has 'never 
been able to assess if they would be near the ton or bottom 
of the list•. 18 Further, he argues that the potential 
17 p 1· . . . 94 ar iamentary Joint Committee, op.cit., p .. 
18 R.H. Mathams, op.cit. 
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disadvantages are far outweighed by the significant 
advantages to Australia of having the joint facilities, 
including his personal knowledge of the discussions at 
very senior between groups of defence officials permitted 
under the Barnard-Schlesinger agreement, the intelligence 
assessments made available to Australian authorities as 
well as the opportunity afforded to put opinions forward 
to the American analytical machinery. 19 In addition, Mathams 
suggests that another advantage in hosting the facilities 
which may not have been fully realised is the potential to 
exercise greater leverage on the American. 
Another significant benefit to Australia 
in having joint facilities here is in the 
strategic sense. The very fact that 
Australia is a very substantial land base 
in the southern hemisphere is an asset 
which I think the Australian government 
should exploit.20 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee in assessing the 
risk to Australia of hosting the joint facilities considered 
that because the Soviet Union expects that the joint facilitie~ 
are involved in carrying out communications and early warning 
• functions they 'would be first order targets in a nuclear war' . 
However the Committee also considers that Australia's role, 
firstly in hosting facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar 
which promote US National Technical Means of Verification 
(NTMV) of the level of the Soviet Union's strategic forces, 
and secondly, at North West Cape which enhances the command 
19 'b'd l l . 
20 'b'd l l . 
21 p 1 · . . . t 31 ar 1amentary Joint Committee, op.cl ., p .. 
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and control system of the American SLBM force, constitute s 
a substantial contribution towards maintenance of the c e ntral 
22 balance. 
Several issues need clarification in making an assessment 
of the significance of the joint facilities for Australia's 
national interests. Given that nuclear war is improbable, 
the facilities can be justified to the extent that they 
promote arms control and contribute to maintenance of the 
central balance. However, conversely, insofar as these 
installations enhance US nuclear war fighting capability, 
destabilising the global balance, they do not promote 
Australia's interests and should be reviewed. The problem 
facing policy makers and defence planners is to apply 
sufficien·t resources to monitor and evaluate develonments 
4 
in the global strategic balance and to promote good regional 
relations and a stable strategic climate. 
Other strategic problems facing Australia are more 
practical in nature. They concern the issues involved in 
putting a policy of continental defence into effect taking 
into account the regional strategic climate. The last 
Defence White Paper setting out the Government's position 
on provisions for security from armed attack was published 
in 1976 and since that time, no further Defence White Papers 
have been publish ed despite significant international 
developments in this period. While the general changes in 
22 ibid., p.42 . 
~: 
Australia's strategic environment have certainly been 
recognised, considerable inertia appears to exist among 
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policy makers and the general public inhibiting a thoroughgoing 
assessment of the practical implications of increased self 
reliance. The geographical realities of a large sparsely 
populated, dry continent, surrounded by oceans and to the 
north by unfamiliar cultures and peoples, traditionally have 
encouraged xenophobic attitudes and the strong alliances 
with powerful friends. However it is clear that, for the 
future, Australia will move in the direction of increased 
self reliance in her defence structure and an independent 
regional capability. In moving in this direction, policy 
development will take account of the reliability of the ANZUS 
security guarantee, the significance of the joint facilities 
and US perceptions of their obligations in this region. 
CHAPTER IV 
AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE POLICY AND THE AMERICAN ALLIANCE 
The alliance with the United States has been the 
fundamental premise on which Australian defence planning 
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has proceeded since the fifties~ Australian policy makers 
and the general public have believed that the American 
alliance is the best defence policy Australia could have and 
to date, little attention has been given to alternative 
strategies. The strongest expression of support for the 
relationship was Prime Minister Holt's decalration that 
'Australia was all the way with LBJ' and although subsequent 
leaders have moderated their public statements and given 
greater emphasis to Australia's independent status as a 
middle power in world affairs, it is apparent that there 
is a general public expectation that the United States will 
come to Australia's aid in times of need. Whilst this is 
certainly a most comforting approach, encouraged by Australia's 
relatively isolated geographical position in the Southern 
hemisphere away from the major areas of international conflict 
and tension and confirmed by Australia's readiness to host 
US facilities and follow the &t1erican lead in many major 
foreign policy decisions, it is not a substitute for an 
Australian national security policy. In the context of a 
rapidly changing strategic environment and recent developments 
in the Indian Ocean littoral it is imperative that defence 
planners constantly reevaluate Australia's defence preparedness 
the ANZUS alliance, the extent and reliability of American 
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protection and the role of the joint defence installations, 
and be provided with the necessary resources to carry out 
this work. 
It is useful to consider the extent to which national 
interests are served on both sides of this asymmetric 
alliance. From the American perspective of a largely bipolar 
world, Australia has been a dependable ally in a distant 
region of the world during a period when dynamic events in 
Japan, China, Indochina, Indonesia, India, Pakistan and the 
Middle East have had great significance for US strategic 
assessments. The Parliamentary Joint Committee in its report 
on 'The ANZUS Alliance' notes the comments of both the US 
Under-Secretary for Defense for Policy, Dr Fred Ikle, and 
the US Deputy Secretary of State, Mr Walter Stoessel, 
approving Australia's defence efforts and the contribution 
made to regional security. 
Mr Stoessel referred to Australia's 
ties with the ASEAN and Pacific 
Nations and summed up his view of 
Australia's strategic position as 
anchoring 'the southern end of the 
western line of defense in East 
Asia and the Pacific' and standing 
guard over a secure, if lengthy, 
line of communication between the 
Pacific and Indian Oceans which was 
of great value in World War II and 1 would be today in the event of war. 
Thus, Australia's compatible social and political traditions 
combined with its geographical location have given it a 
significant role, albeit a minor one, to play in American 
strategic analysis of the Asia-Pacific region. 
1 Parliamentary Joint Committee, Australia-United States 
Relations: The ANZUS Alliance, p.41. 
On Australia's part, the ANZUS Alliance is the 
cornerstone of defence planning and the development of 
national security policy. Reluctantly agreed to by the 
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United States and pursued vigorously on the Australian side, 
it has served Australia's interests well. In providing 
great power commitment to 'act to meet the common danger' 
in the event of armed attack on any of the Parties (Articles 
IV and V of the Treaty), it has given a sense of security 
and reassurance of enormous value, not lessened by its 
intangible quality. Whilst any assessment of the importance 
. 
of ANZUS includes both costs and benefits, the expectation 
of military support in a situation of grave danger to 
Australia remains the basic reason for the existence of 
the Treaty, the generally uncritical support for US policies 
and until recently 1 the unquestioning acceptance of the 
joint defence facilities. 
The Department of Defence in its submission to the 
Joint Committee outlined the official view of the security 
value of ANZUS to Australia inthe following terms. 
First, if a security problem arose 
in our region, with which we could 
not deal unaided, the ANZUS treaty 
would guarantee Australia's security; 
secondly, ANZUS has a day-to-day 
relevance on the basis of a partnership 
which can be seen at work in such areas 
as exchanges of intelligence and 
military doctrine, the operations of 
the joint facilities and Australian 
participation in joint naval and 
military exercises; thirdly, ANZUS 
also has a wider significance as an 
important part of the web of alliances 
and treaty arrangements which constitute 
the Western Alliance - it is within this 
framework that the Australian offer of 
home porting facilities at Cockburn Sound 
to US Navy ships engaged in patrolling 
the Indian Ocean for example, is seen 
as linked to Australia's obligations 
under ANZUS, as is a range of cooperative 
activities including the joint defence 
facilities, cooperation in communications 
arrangements and logistic support 
arrangements, and the provision of transit 
facilities for US B52 aircraft and 
facilities for 5ertain US military 
exercises here. 
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However, in relation to the question of the likely response 
of the US to a military threat to Australia there was 
general agreement from all expert witnesses that 'Australia 
cannot automatically expect to receive US assistance in all 
contingencies' . 3 R.J. O'Neill described the likely US 
response as follows: 
In the event of a serious threat to 
Australia's security I think it is 
very difficult to imagine the United 
States Congress being at all reluctant 
to provide support for the security of 
Australia in view of the warmth of the 
relationship and the historical continuity 
of commitment that has gone on for some 
forty years now. What I would be more 
concerned about is not American political 
unwillingness to provide support but 
physical incapability. If Australia's 
security was threatened at a time of 
high tension elsewhere in the world and 
the Americans had to concentrate their 
forces more in the European and Middle 
East and North Asian theatres, there 
might not be very much left to maintain 
security in this part of the world.4 
The benefits of the broader Australia-United States 
security relationship include the contribution to Australia's 
2 ibid. ' p.29. 
3 ibid. ' p.30. 
4 ibid. , p.32. 
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defence capability through supply and transfer of the latest 
weapons technology and equipment, the sharing of intelligence, 
the Memorandum of Understanding on mutual logistic support 
and the training benefit from a wide range of bilateral, 
ANZUS and other multilateral exercises. In addition the 
ANZUS relationship facilitates a strategic dialogue with 
the US, represents an effective deterrent to potential 
aggressors and confers an enhanced status on Australia within 
its region. In this context, and as noted in the Department 
of Defence submissions above, the joint defence installations 
are linked to Australia's obligations under ANZUS. As 
C. Bell has argued, 
If the decision to opt out of ANZUS 
were ever taken by any of the foreseeable 
policy makers in office in Canberra, it 
would obviously only be in political 
circumstances which would require the 
ending of the special arrangements 
governing the function of the US strategic 
and intelligence installations in 
Australia - North West Cape, Pine Gap and 
others. Whatever their nominal status 
these installations are essentially 
expressions of the general sense of 
parallel diplomatic and strategic 
interests of which ANZUS is the formal 
and legal acknowledgement. There would 
be no logic in continuing to sustain the 
installations if the treaty was abandoned: 
that would be on a par with continuing to 
pay the premium after renouncing the 
insurance policy.5 
The costs of the ANZUS alliance include four main 
considerations: the extent to which the joint facilities 
may be nuclear targets, the loss of sovereignty as a result 
of inadequate consultation and access , the possible distortion 
5 C . Bell, ' The Case for the Alliance', Paper presented to the 
SDSC Conference on Australian Defence Policies for the 1980s, 
A.N.U ., 1981. 
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of national defence posture as a result of uncritical 
acceptance of US strategic analysis and diplomatic constraints 
imposed by the Alliance in relation to regional policies. 
In relation to nuclear targeting the Parliamentary 
Joint Committee recognises that there is a finite risk that 
one or all of the facilities would be on the Soviet target 
list in the course of a nuclear war but states that 
&•• the part played by the joint 
facilities at Pine Gap and Nurrungar 
in monitoring and gathering intelligence 
on Soviet forces and weapons movements, 
their verification capabilities in regard 
to arms limitations agreements, as well as 
the important contribution made by the 
facility at North West Cape to United 
States defence, make a vital contribution 
to the whole Western Alliance. Therefore 
on balance, the Committee agrees with the 
assessment made by this, and former 
governments, that the benefits to Western 
defences and hence Australia's ultimate 
security outweigh any risks the presence 
of these facilities entail.6 
On the question of loss of Australian sovereignty, 
the Committee, while acknowledging instances of inadequate 
consultation over the joint facilities, rejects D. Ball's 
view that these examples demonstrate an unacceptable level 
of Australian access and participation. Successive spokesmen 
from major political parties have confirmed their general 
support for the functions and operations of the joint 
facilities although in recent years there has been greater 
sensitivity on the implications for Australian sovereignty. 
Overall, there is general support for the view that 'there 
is no unacceptable loss of sovereignty arising from the 
6 Parliamentary Joint Committee, op.cit., p.58. 
presence of the joint facilities' and that 'on balance, 
Australian access to and participation in the operations 
of the joint facility at North West Cape is appropriate 
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in the context of Australia's responsibilities under the 
ANZUS Alliance'. 7 In addition the Committee emphasises the 
substantial benefit derived from the fact that the facilities 
are a 'card of entry' to allied intelligence policies 
and decision making. 
The view that Australia's defence policy has been 
distorted by continued emphasis on ANZUS is argued by D. Ball 
who has drawn attention to the impossibility of stretching 
defence budget allocations to plan for both the defence of 
Australia as well as a forces structure designed for distant 
operations in conjunction with US forces. 8 The Strategic 
Basis papers place greatest emphasis on the need to ensure 
effective regional capabilities and state that 
In sum, the basic strategicfeatures 
of our own neighbourhood have 
potential to absorb our total defence 
effort. Neighbourhood contingencies 
might now be seen as r e mote. Should 
they arise however we would face 9 defence problems of grave dimensions. 
However R. O'Neill has suggested that, because of the less 
stable international environment, Australia's defence 
priorities should at present be directed primarily towards 
7 
. b. d l l . 
8 ibid., p.63. 
9 
'The Strategic Basis Papers', op.cit., p.30. 
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maintenance of the global balance and support for the ANZUS 
11 . 10 a iance. 
These positions are not mutually exclusive and the 
problem facing defence planners is to optimise the resources 
available and to develop a national security policy flexible 
enough to adapt to changing priorities and assessments of 
national interest ~ The Committee concluded that ANZUS 
provides many practical benefits to Australian forces and 
does not distort defence policy. 
The present level of defence cooperation 
between Australia and the United States 
is not inimical to Australia's national 
or regional interests, and it offers a 
measure of protection should Soviet 
penetrations of the South Pacific-Indian 
Ocean areas become a more direct threat to 
Australia's own interests in the region~ll 
It is possible that the alliance may have resulted in 
some foreign policy constraints, for example in relation to 
proposals for a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean and a 
nuclear free zone in the Pacific Ocean, but on the whole 
there has been very little effect on policy development. 
Indeed, in matters concerning trade and investment, a strong 
Australian-US relationship has been forged but at the same 
time, each side has shown a willingness to take immediate 
action to preserve a bargaining position or protect national 
interests. The Austra l ian government has also been prepared 
lO R. O'Neill, evidence to Parliamentary Joint Committee, 
10 February 1981. 
11 1· . . . 67 Par iamentary Joint Committee, op.cit., p .. 
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to take strong action in relation to the extraterritorial 
reach of US laws. 12 In addition, Prof. Albinski notes that 
... as a neighbouring power of modest size 
with an attractive decolonisation record 
and anti-nuclear testing credentialst 
Australia is able to bring influence to 
bear into Papua New Guinea and the rest 
of the South Pacific in ways quite 
unavailable to the us.13 
Thus, in exercising a more independent approach to regional 
concerns and foreign policy formulation, Australia, . in 
addition to promoting her own interests can promote those 
of the alliance as well. 
Overall, it can be argued that in terms of nuclear 
war or maJor invasion the most advantageous policy for 
Australia is support for the Alliance including the joint 
facilities 1 along with a program of constant monitoring of 
national interests and strategic assessments. As P. Dibb 
comments 
Australia's membership of ANZUS seems 
likely to endure although . it may well 
be modified. It is undoubtedly 
important for Australia to continue to 
host US facilities, which strengthen 
deterrence by providing warning and by 
increasing the credibility of the US 
sunmarine based second strike system. 
These facilities seem likely to remain 
of vital strategic concern to the US 
for a long time yet and, subject to the 
requirement of the fullest consultation 
between governments as to their functions 
and operations, the1 should be maintained on Australian soil. 4 
12 This is the subject of a further Report of the Joint 
Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence. 
13 1· . . . 73 Par iamentary Joint Conunittee, op.cit., p .. 
14 P. Dibb, 'World Political and Strategic Trends Over the Next 
Twenty Years - Their Relevance to Australia', S.D.S.C. Working 
Paper No.65, p.14. 
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In this respect, the best defence policy for Australia 
rests on the continuation of ANZUS and the global protection 
afforded by the US nuclear umbrella, along with the 
development of an independent defence capability able to 
meet contingencies arising . in the immediate region. 
In meeting intermediate and low level threats, 
Australia's defence planners face a different set of problems . 
Threats such as lodgements on Australian territory, major 
raids, aggression against a regional country 1 blockades and 
disruption to shipping and trade, could conceivably be 
launched by some of Australia's Asian neighbours. However, 
at the present time, in the absence of any serious dispute, 
this is not considered likely. Nevertheless, in a more 
volatile international climate, threats could arise quickly 
and unexpectedly, especially if a hostile state was assisted 
to build up its capability by a superpower~ 
The Parliamentary Joint Committee Report points out 
that to meet such contingencies, Australian defence planning 
should emphasise effective and integrated surveillance systems 
especially in sparsely populated areas, the possibility of 
US intervention as a consequence of ANZUS and diplomatic 
efforts to bring pressure to bear on the hostile state. 
The Committee comments 
Taking into account that intermediate 
threats may call for a greater need for 
Australian self reliance, the military 
deterrents to these threats are not 
greatly different to those for invasion. 
Australia's naval and airforces must be 
seen to be capable of destroying the 
attacking forces while moving to or from 
Australia or of destroying their lines of 
communication with their home bases and 
should pose an unacceptable risk for any 
regional state contemplating hostile 
action ... The deterrent effect is 
enhanced if our ready reaction forces 
demonstrate the ability - preferably in 
cooperation with allies - to make rapid 
deployments to those parts of Australian 
territory that are more vulnerable.15 
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In the absence of a foreseeable threat the problem 
facing defence planners is the choice of a methodological 
approach. In addition, assessments need to be made regarding 
the cirucmstances in which its combat assistance under the 
ANZUS treaty might be invoked. 16 Langtry and Ball point 
to the urgent need to clarify the relevant operational 
concepts and policies~ 
Should Australia pursue a maritime 
defence based on submarines and long 
range stiike aircraft? Should we adopt 
a territorial concept involving the 
mobilisation of society at large, with 
large numbers armed with relatively low 
technology weapons? Should we rely on 
nuclear weapons as 'the absolute deterrent'? 
Should we accept occupation and prepare 
for mass civil resistance?l7 
15 1 • ' • t h 1 • I Par iamentary Joint Cammi tee, Treats to Austra ia s 
Security, op.cit., p.81. 
16 The only clear case is if a superpower rival makes an 
isolated attack on Australia. All other hypothetical 
situations entail ambiguous responses. This is outlined 
in R. Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, p.13, Table 2. 
It is of course possible that ambiguity on Australian-US 
relations may enhance security by deterring potential 
aggressors who have no wish to risk antagonising a superpower. 
However ambiguity backed by a credible Australian capability 
would be preferable. 
17 J.O. Langtry and D. Ball, Controlling Australia's Threat 
Environment, p.x. 
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~hey believe that reluctance to delineate futu r e policy is 
based on a general climate of opinion in favour of preserving 
the status quo in relation to the three services and draw 
attention to the implications of unclear strategic doctrine 
for issues of equipment procurement and forces planning. 
The recent debate over the purchase of an aircraft carrier 
and the Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on this 
subject illustrate the need for clarification of strategic 
doctrine. 
Several methodological approaches have been applied. 
Current defence plans are based on a 'core force' approach 
whereby a wide range of incipient capabilities is maintained 
with the ability to expand rapidly in conjunction with 
acquisition of state-of-art knowledge of equipment. The 
major difficulty with this concept is the problem of defining 
core elements in the absence of an overall framework and 
policy guidance, and forecasting the resources required 
as well as the parameters of expansion. Consequently there 
is a danger that precedents and existing parity amongst 
the services may become institutionalised and that defence 
procurement may not be effective if services compete for 
resources and more high-technology equipment. As a largely 
reactive model, the core force concept has inherent 
limitations in its ability to cope with emergencies and this 
would also apply if the possible source of such emergencies 
could somehow be ascertained. 
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An alternative approach which has been used is to 
consider a wide range of possible threat contingencies and 
then design appropriate responses. The greatest problem 
with such a methodology is to determine whether all the 
likely possibilities have been covered and which are the 
most probable. Langtry and Ball have outlined why scenario-
based methodologies are unsuitable. 
It is extremely difficult to design 
scenarios which are acceptable to all 
participants in a given decision-making 
process and more importantly which can 
remain relevant throughout the life cycle 
of a given capability.18 
Babbage has attempted to broaden the scenario approach 
by placing emphasis on high levels of flexibility and 
adaptability in the Australian defence structure and by 
attaching priorities to a full array of potential pressures 
and threats. This approach was also adopted by the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee in its enquiry into Threats 
to Australia's Security. Such analysis provides a useful 
description of the range of threats and the global context, 
but in terms of practical planning decisions, is again subject 
to the same limitations as the scenario method. Babbage 
recognises that many of the potential conflicts arising 
from global crises are beyond Austalia's capacity to deter 
and suggests that the greatest efforts should be made towards 
prevention of serious instability by diplomatic means which 
are infinitely preferable to reliance on defensive measures. 
18 
'b'd 7 l l ., p .. 
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The 'prevention is better than cure' adage is embodied 
in the planning methodology and forces structure advocated 
by Langtry and Ball. They argue that a 'thre at insensitive' 
approach will best serve Australia's interests, and premise 
their discussion on the theme that 
Australia's strategic advantage is such 
that we are in a position to dictate what 
would be needed by an aggressor to mount 
a military threat - especially high levels 
of threat such as lodgement operations and 
invasion - in other words that, through the 
proper application of a deterrent posture, 
Australia can effectively control its 
'threat environment•.19 
They recognise current resources constraints but 
argue that, by analysis of the theories of deterrence and 
disproportionate response and by designing a forces structure 
which balances deterrence capabilities with war fighting 
capabilities, Australia would be capable from its own 
resources of deterring, and if necessary, defeating all 
possible threats mounted by regional powers . They further 
argue that such threat insensitive methodology would increase 
national self confidence by relieving Australians of their 
insecurity and 'threat-mentality' and would enable greater 
economic and social cooperation throughout the region which 
in turn would foster a favourable security environment. 
Clearly, this is a highly desirable outcome, but considerable 
analysis and rethinking of these concepts (largely derived from 
the nuclear tactics of the superpowers) would have to occur 
before they could be translated into a suitable forces structure 
19 ibid. 
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for Australia's defence, although the core of deterrent 
strike force (including F-llls, future F-18s etc.) already 
exists Langtry and Ball themselves revert to a scenario 
approach when applying their principles, but on the whole, 
this methodology offers a more promising planning approach. 
For the future it is clear that Australian defence 
policy will be developed in a climate of greater global 
tensions and where there is a no guarantee that the ANZUS 
alliance can be relied upon other than at times of grave 
danger to Australia. In the Review of ANZUS carried out in 
July 1983 the Foreign Minister Mr Hayden reaffirmed the main 
tenets of the treaty and clarified the following points 
about the relationship. 
The erroneous notion that Australia is 
totally dependent on ANZUS, and thus the 
United States for its national security, 
implies an unquestioning deferential 
relationship which would be unhealthy in 
itself and also a very poor basis for 
effective defence planning.20 
... agreement was explicitly reached as 
to Australia's primary defence role, 
namely one of building our self defence 
capability within our regional context, 
rather than as a presumed global role as 
some sort of appendix of a superpower. 
That clarification will allow a much more 
explicit and precise formulation of our 
defence thinking and will govern the 
defence structure that we establish for 
our defence force.21 
In relation to the joint defence facilities at North West 
Cape, Pine Gap and Nurrungar he stated that 
20 
W. Hayden, Statement on !he Review of ANZUS, July 1983, p.7. 
21 ibid., p.10. 
... the facilities clearly represent an 
important reflection and instance of the 
shared interests which the Treaty 
embodies, and the Government regards 
this form of cooperation with the United 
States as of unique value.22 
These statements, together with Australia's initiative 
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in requesting the Review, indicate a greater concern about 
national sovereignty and national interests whilst at the 
same time stressing the continuity of the relationship in 
terms of global security~ It is also apparent that greater 
attention is being given to the development of coordinated 
defence, foreign and economic policies in Southeast Asia 
and the South West Pacific in order to promote regional 
stability and 'control' the 'threat environment'. 
In terms of global nuclear threats it is evident that 
Australia is linked in a worldwide network of installations 
to the US strategic forces and in this respect as well as 
in the context of the ANZUS treaty, it can expect considerable 
American protection. However it is Australia's contribution 
to global stability and its hosting of American facilities 
which now underpins the ANZUS Alliance rather than the need 
for regional security. Further, the Australian foreign policy 
tradition of attempting to ensure regional stability by 
great power commitments is being influenced by an awareness 
of the need to establish bilateral and multilateral relations 
with Southeast Asian nations along with a more credible 
and independent defence capability. 
22 ibid., p.11. 
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Paradoxically, the emphasis on a more self reliant 
defence policy dictates the need for closer intelligence, 
technical and military ties with the United States and 
continued cooperation in relation to the management of the 
joint facilities. The sharing of intelligence and the 
access to American strategic thinking are both extremely 
important for developing an ongoing analysis and review of 
national interests and the strategic environment. It 
appears that, to date, Australia may not have made full use 
of its potential influence with the Americans in relation to 
joint management of the installations and that outdated 
habits of suppressing information about the functions carried 
out at these stations may have caused unnecessary concern. 
The Prime Ministerial statement to Parliament on 6 June 1984 
and the subsequent pamphlet by the Minister for Forei gn 
Affairs have addressed the need for public information and 
attempted to clarify the issues. Certainly it can be expected 
that the nature of the operations carried out at the facilities 
will be of continued interest and that questions about 
Australian access to the facilities would be unlikely to 
disappear in a climate where information was unnecessarily 
restricted. In this respect, the promotion of informed 
public debate about t h e joint facilities, about the strategic 
environment and about Australian defence policy should be 
encouraged. 
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